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Abstract. Distance-Based Message Authentication (DBMA) provides an 
additional layer of access control and helps to defend against key compromise 
and denial-of-service attacks on constrained nodes. The distance between 
sender and receiver is measured securely. Messages sent from outside a defined 
physical distance can be rejected early, protecting vulnerable higher layers. We 
show our initial implementation using the Nanotron NA5TR1. We show how 
changing MAC addresses can avoid modification to ranging hardware. 
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1   Introduction 
WSN security is usually based on cryptography, introducing vulnerabilities such as 
key-compromise and denial-of-service. Distance-Based Message Authentication 
(DBMA) is an additional security layer that helps to protect against such attacks 
without using keys. It measures the distance between a transmitter and receiver during 
link-layer message exchange and rejects messages from outside a specified distance. 
The challenge in any implementation is that the ranging and message transmission 
must be performed securely and accurately. An attacker should not be able to reduce 
his apparent range and must not be able to hijack an existing message exchange (i.e. 
defeating the range measurement entirely). 
Our existing theoretical protocol called RTTMAP[1] uses a three-way handshake 
for each message exchange. It uses the round-trip-time method to calculate the 
physical separation of nodes. A nonce is utilized during ranging that prevents an 
attacker from replying early by forcing them to wait for an unpredictable value. A 
hash commitment is used in the first handshake to prevent an attacker from hijacking 
an existing exchange. 
Our initial analysis considered the Nanotron NA5TR1 transceiver[2] which 
supports the required ranging accuracy (by using Chirp Spread Spectrum modulation) 
but is not directly compatible with RTTMAP as data cannot be inserted into ranging 
packets. Our modified protocol eliminates this requirement by using the standard 
ranging functions. We still use a hash commitment, but use modified MAC addresses 
instead of a nonce and transmit the message separately. This paper presents the 
protocol, a security analysis and our initial findings. We conclude with future work. 
  
Fig. 1. The Sender sends a commitment to the Receiver. The Sender changes its MAC address 
using the commitment. The Receiver changes to a random MAC address. The Receiver 
performs a hardware-based ranging event with the Sender. Finally, the Message is transmitted 
to the Receiver and is checked against the commitment. 
2   Protocol and Security 
The objective of the protocol is to reject messages received from outside of a defined 
physical limit. Other security protocols may still be in place to provide other forms of 
protection.  The following procedure is used for each message exchange (See Fig. 1): 
 
1. The Sender prepares a message m in advance (usually including a counter 
value to prevent replay attack) and hashes it to form commitment c. 
2. The Sender transmits c to the Receiver. 
3. c is truncated by both parties to form the temporary Sender MAC address s. 
4. The Receiver generates a random MAC address r. 
5. The Sender changes its MAC address to s and the Receiver changes to r. 
6. The Receiver initiates a hardware ranging request with the Sender. 
7. The Sender returns the ranging acknowledgement. 
8. The Receiver aborts if the measured distance exceeds the defined limit. 
9. The Sender then sends m. 
10. The Receiver only accepts m if it hashes to c. 
11. Both nodes reset their MAC addresses. 
 
The hardware ranging is securely combined with message transmission such that 
an attacker cannot reduce the measured distance, cannot utilize an existing node for 
the ranging part and cannot hijack an existing message exchange to insert messages. 
The MAC change at the Sender prevents the attacker from causing the receiver to 
initiate a ranging request with a genuine node. The genuine node will not modify its 
MAC address and therefore will not respond. An attacker could attempt to form a 
collision, in order to obtain a MAC address that is identical to an existing node. This 
would be difficult given the necessary structure of a message. Additionally, nodes 
will not respond to unexpected ranging requests. 
The commitment c also ensures that the message that is finally transmitted is the 
same as the one intended for transmission. An attacker would need to find a collision 
in c in order to hijack an existing genuine message exchange. This is infeasible in the 
available time. 
The MAC change on the Receiver prevents an attacker from arbitrarily sending the 
ranging acknowledgement early as the destination is not known in advance. The 
attacker can thus not reduce the distance measurement, without significant hardware 
modification, due to physical limitation (the speed of light). 
3   Implementation and Performance 
We have implemented the protocol using the Nanotron DK sensor boards. These 
comprise of a NA5TR1 Chirp-Spread-Spectrum transceiver and an ATmega128 CPU. 
Our code utilizes the Nanotron API to control the MAC address, exchange messages, 
perform ranging and to manipulate transceiver state. We use the Fast Ranging mode, 
attaining a ranging accuracy of approximately 1m and maximum range of 
approximately 25m indoors. We show that DBMA is feasible without making 
hardware changes to the transceiver. 
For the hash functionality, we use the SHA-256 function from the MIRACL[3] 
library. This is truncated when used to set MAC addresses. 
4   Conclusion and Future Work 
We have shown that the RTTMAP principle can be implemented using standard 
ranging functionality in existing WSN hardware. Our implementation will be further 
evaluated to identify detailed ranging accuracy properties as well as performance 
implications in throughput and energy. Our security analysis will identify if it is 
vulnerable to existing ranging attacks (such as late-commit), determine the security of 
the cryptographic primitives used in this context and the analyze potential for 
attackers to develop hardware to permit a faster turnaround time during ranging. We 
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